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Brazil’s Nuclear Policy 
From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power 
 
 
Abstract 
Since March 2006 Brazil has been the ninth country to control the full nuclear fuel cycle. 
While the U.S. government bashes the uranium enrichment activities in Iran, it has come 
to an arrangement with the uranium enrichment in its backyard after transitional diplo-
matic tensions. As signer of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Brazil has the right to enrich ura-
nium for peaceful use. This article focuses on the political motives and objectives con-
nected with the domination of this key technology. Brasilia has been striving for regional 
leadership and participation in international decision making processes. In historical per-
spective the Brazilian enrichment procedure marks the liberation from the technological 
U.S. dependence. Brazil seems to be on the way to establish itself as a civil nuclear power 
in international relations. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Brasiliens Nuklearpolitik. Von der technologischen Dependenz zur zivilen Atommacht 
Brasilien beherrscht seit Anfang Mai 2006 als neuntes Land der Welt den vollständigen 
Brennstoffkreislauf. Während die US-Regierung die Urananreicherungsaktivitäten im Iran 
scharf verurteilt, hat sie sich nach vorübergehenden diplomatischen Spannungen mit mit 
der Urananreicherung in ihrem geostrategischen „Hinterhof“ arrangiert. Als Signatarstaat 
des Atomwaffensperrvertrags hat Brasilien das Recht, zur zivilen Nutzung Uran anzurei-
chern. Dennoch stellt sich die Frage nach den politischen Zielen und Motiven, die mit der 
Beherrschung dieser Schlüsseltechnologie verbunden sind. Neben energiepolitischen Mo-
tiven bemüht sich Brasilia seit langem darum, sein Profil als regionale Führungsmacht zu 
schärfen. Vor dem Hintergrund der jüngsten Entwicklungen der globalen Nuklearpolitik 
ist Brasilien auf dem Weg, sich als zivile Nuklearmacht zu etablieren. 
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1. Introduction 
When Brazil puts the uranium enrichment plant Resende II into operation shortly, it will be 
the ninth country of the world to control the full nuclear fuel cycle. The government of 
President Lula da Silva refuses the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) the inspection of the ultracentrifuge, which represents the heart of the plant. This 
way Brasilia wants to protect its innovative technology from industrial spying. While the 
U.S. government bashes the uranium enrichment activities in Iran, it has come to an ar-
rangement concerning the uranium enrichment in its geostrategic backyard after temporary 
diplomatic tensions with the Brazilian regional leader.  
As a signer of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil has the right for peaceful use of nu-
clear energy. At the same time the members of the regime are obliged to allow the IAEA-
inspectors the control of their plants. Uranium enrichment plants in particular may be used 
for civil as well as military purposes (dual use-technology) and are therefore considered to be 
a milestone on the way towards being a nuclear power. Consequently, at the verification 
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conference of the NPT in May 2005, the previous nuclear weapon states – especially the 
U.S. – tried to restrict the sensitive enrichment and recycling technologies to the present 
technology owners. Just like the other non-nuclear weapon states, Brazil was not willing to 
give up the right for uranium enrichment, but makes use of it instead now. Against this 
background, the present article will deal with the following questions: What are the goals 
and issues of the current Brazilian nuclear policy? How does it fit into the international non-
proliferation regime? What influence does it bear on the bilateral relations with the U.S. as 
determining actor of global nuclear policy? 
From a historic perspective, the Brazilian enrichment procedure marks the liberation from 
the technological dependence from the United States that Brazil has seen itself caught in 
since the end of World War II. Through a long period, Brazil had been waiting in vain for 
Washington’s atomic know-how. Neither the offer of exports of crude uranium to the U.S. 
nor changes of foreign policy by Brazilian governments led to the hoped-for transfer of 
technology. Numerous doctrines of the Brazilian foreign policy had been connected with 
rapprochements with Washington: From the Operação Panamericana under President 
Kubitschek at the end of the 1950s over the Automatic Alliance with the USA under General 
Castelo Branco in the 1960s up to the Projeto Brasil Potência under General Garrastazu Médici 
at the beginning of the 1970s.  
Subsequently, the Brazilian military governments – the striving for nuclear weapons which 
became more and more obvious in the context of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry – tried to 
get new cooperation partners. When the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to do business 
with the authoritarian government of Ernesto Geisel it was again the White House that ve-
toed the planned transfer of technology. Only when re-democratized Brazil was integrating 
itself into the net of international nuclear control regimes during the 1990s, the relations 
with the U.S. improved increasingly. 
On the one hand, a trusting cooperation between Washington and Brasilia has resulted, 
which is in the meantime also marked by the acceptance of the Brazilian claim to regional 
leadership. On the other hand, the U.S. government’s nuclear and security policy does cur-
rently not focus on Latin America. The escalation of the conflict of the international commu-
nity with the Iranian regime moves Brazil’s nuclear policy into the background as well as 
the latest nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. The cooperation with 
the non-signer of the NPT marks a U-turn of Washington’s foreign policy after all. Only Bra-
silia’s intention to cooperate with opponents of Washington allows the nuclear ambitions of 
the Amazon state to come to the fore again. The government da Silva discusses cooperation 
possibilities concerning civil utilization of atomic energy with the Chavist Venezuela as well 
as China, the ascending global rival of the United States. President Chávez, whom U.S. Sec-
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retary of State Rice describes as a “negative factor in the hemisphere” and who does not try 
to hide his good relations with the OPEC-partner Iran, would like to integrate Teheran into 
the nuclear cooperation with Brasilia. 
It is questionable how Brazil will position itself on the far field of the global nuclear policy in 
the future: Is the striving for nuclear weapons and the opting out of the NPT, following the 
Indian example, a realistic option for the Brazilian government? Alternatively, will the aspi-
rant to a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council confine itself to the civil use of nuclear 
energy in order to overcome its chronic scarcity of energy? Both options would lead to the 
preference for different partners in the nuclear cooperation. From the U.S. foreign policy’s 
point of view the question raises, how the good relation with the regional leader Brazil can 
be maintained on the one hand and how the global proliferation risk can be kept small on 
the other hand. Furthermore, the government of President Bush has to be concerned with 
not losing entirely its credibility and authority as global nuclear leader despite the different 
dealing with the nuclear ambitions of Brazil, India and Iran. 
 
 
2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Basic Problems 
The NPT was concluded on 1 July 1968 on the initiative of the USA, the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain and became effective in 1970, after it had been ratified by 147 states. To date 
188 countries have signed the treaty. It is meant to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and to enable also non-atomic-powers to peaceful use. The treaty defines prolifera-
tion as production or acquisition of nuclear explosive charges by all the states that have not 
tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 – therefore all the states except for the USA, 
the Soviet Union (respectively Russia), France, China and Great Britain, which count by it as 
official nuclear powers. According to the treaty, the transfer of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices to any recipient is prohibited (article I). The remaining 183 coun-
tries, amongst them Brazil, that have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states must not 
change their status of non-nuclear weapon states according to article II of the NPT. By article 
VI of the NPT all parties are obliged to a general and complete nuclear disarmament. In 
practise this applies to the nuclear powers. 
Besides the official nuclear powers the non-members of the NPT Israel, India and Pakistan 
are considered unofficial nuclear powers. In 2003 North Korea terminated the NPT and de-
clared the possession of nuclear weapons in November 2003. Iran signed the NPT, but 
dodges it in many ways. After the IAEA had issued an ultimatum to Iran, even this state 
signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT in December 2003. This protocol had been de-
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cided on due to the experiences with the arms plans of Iraq after the Gulf War in 1991. It 
offers more effective controllability such as unannounced and almost unrestricted control of 
the nuclear plants (see Hooper 1999). Brazil refuses the signature of the Additional Protocol 
to the NPT until today. 
The NPT and its Additional Protocol make the nuclear-technological progress of the emerg-
ing and developing countries more difficult even in the sector of civil research and use. After 
all, “paradoxically it has the effect of disarming the unarmed”, as the former Argentine U.N. 
Ambassador José María Ruda notices quite accurately (quoted in La Nación, 18 April 2004). 
Particularly regarding those states with a developing nuclear industry on the one side and 
not belonging to any military alliance (Argentina, Brazil) – especially during the Cold War – 
on the other side, the NPT did not provide favourable starting points for the scientific-
technological process in the nuclear sector. The technological dependence Brazil considers 
itself to be caught in seems to be the price for the prevention of the potential abuse of nu-
clear technology, since passing on nuclear technology to irresponsible states and other actors 
is a precondition of its abuse. 
The international regimes for the control of means of nuclear mass destruction have not 
turned out to be very effective. This is particularly shown by the nuclear bomb tests firstly 
by India and shortly after by Pakistan, the presentation of the North Korean long-range mis-
sile as well as the discovery of a parallel nuclear project in Iran. Especially those states that 
have not signed respectively cancelled the NPT, but are demonstrably in the possession of 
nuclear weapons (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) undermine the NPT considerably. 
In order to reduce the proliferation risk and to reinforce the NPT these states would also 
have to be included in the non-proliferation regime. However, not demanding a member-
ship as non-nuclear weapon country from them without compromising the central terms of 
the contract at the same time is similar to the squaring of the circle (Müller 2005: 3). The 
mentioned states are little willing to negotiate because their nuclear weapons give them lev-
erage in foreign policy and keep hostile states at a distance. Jonathan Shell (see 2000) also 
comes to this conclusion. In his Foreign Affairs-article “The Folly of Arms Control” he de-
scribes the proliferation as a kind of stepchild of the deterrence logic of the Cold War, which 
militarily inferior states use in order to protect themselves against (preventive) efforts for 
intervention by more powerful actors. 
The failing of the seventh verification conference of the NPT in May 2005 in New York is 
characteristic of the crisis of the regulation of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ac-
cording to international law. Contrasting interests of the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear 
weapon states were the reason for this. At first the U.S. government (tacitly supported by 
France) refused to accept the hard fought for compromise of the verification conference from 
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2000 with its disarmament program of the “13 steps”. As a result of this attitude the non-
nuclear weapon states rejected any strengthening of the non-proliferation aspects of the re-
gime like verification, export controls, conviction of violators of the contract and institu-
tional reform (Müller 2005: 2). Another area of conflict that became obvious during the con-
ference refers to the right of all parties of the treaty for the unhindered peaceful use of the 
nuclear energy guaranteed in article IV of the NPT. So the non-nuclear weapon states must 
have understood U.S. President Bush’s request for restricting even the civil operation of en-
richment and recycling to the present technology-owners and to achieve this by strict trans-
fer refusal if necessary as a frontal attack to their rights from article IV. In contrast to Presi-
dent Bush, a group of experts of the IAEA examining options for internationalising the sen-
sitive dual-use-technology (including a system for the guarantee of fuel deliveries) came to 
the result that a step of this kind is only possible at present if it is done voluntarily. An 
amendment of the NPT to the debit of the non-nuclear weapon countries were only think-
able in connection with considerable disarmament contributions of the nuclear weapon 
states and only if the new rule applies to all without exception (IAEA 2005, quoted in Müller 
2005: 5). The U.S. delegation regarded this balancing of interests as unacceptable again. Fi-
nally the conference failed and the non-nuclear weapon states continued to insist on their 
right to enrich nuclear fuel for civil use. One year later Brazil, who was holding the presi-
dency of the New York conference and therefore playing a neutral role, made use of this 
right. 
 
 
3. Brazil’s Nuclear Policy in Historical Perspective 
Bilateral Relations after World War II: Brazil’s Futile Waiting for U.S. Nuclear  
Know-how 
In the 1940s the topic of the Brazilian nuclear policy was addressed by the agenda of the 
bilateral relations between the USA and Brazil for the first time. After great sources of ura-
nium had been discovered in Brazil one decade earlier, President Getúlio Vargas concluded 
an agreement on common uranium exploitation with the USA. Three subsequent agree-
ments were intended: Brazil should be compensated for its uranium supplies by nuclear 
technology from Washington. In 1946 the USA submitted the proposal to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the U.N. for the founding of an international board for the 
control of the worldwide sources of uranium (Plan Baruch).1 Brazil and the Soviet Union 
were the only countries to refuse the U.S. initiative. The Brazilian representative Álvaro Al-
                                                     
1  For Plan Baruch see: www.nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/1946/460614-baruch.html, 4 October 2004. 
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berto da Mota e Silva suggested the principle of specific compensations instead, which 
should have allowed Brazil the further construction of nuclear reactors on its territory in 
return for natural uranium supplies. 
In order to prevent the unregulated uranium exportation in 1951 the National Research 
Council (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas – CNPq) was founded in Rio de Janeiro. In February 
1952 the two governments concluded an agreement on the sale of Brazilian uranium. How-
ever, the U.S. refused its trading partner “specific compensations” and the transfer of tech-
nology for the development of the Brazilian atomic energy sector failed to happen again 
(ComCiência 2004: 9). 
When it became public that German technology was delivered to Brazil for the construction 
of three uranium enrichment centrifuges in 1954, the South American country’s intentions of 
acquiring nuclear technology became evident again. It has been an open secret that the nu-
clear technology was also intended to be for military use (Schirm 1994: 194). However, the 
import of the German ultra-centrifuge-method failed due to the U.S. occupying power, 
which prohibited the transport of the centrifuges to South America. 
Vice-President João Café Filho’s (1954-1956) assumption of the state affairs led only to short-
time stabilization of the relations with Washington, which Brazil criticised for being one-
sided. During his short rule Café Filho concluded several agreements on the cooperation 
with the United States in the civil use of nuclear power. In 1955 the broad bilateral coopera-
tion in the nuclear sector was agreed once again: The Cooperation Treaty for the Peaceful Devel-
opment of Atomic Energy planned that Brazil should get up to six kilogram enriched uranium 
(20%) for the production of energy in reactors hired from the U.S. within a period of five 
years. A Common Program for the Research and Estimation of the Uranium Sources in Brazil was 
to investigate the Brazilian reserves of uranium, which again were to be sold to the USA. At 
the same time the two states concluded a second Cooperation Agreement on the Research of the 
Brazilian Uranium Sources that intended the removal of research reactors as well as the estab-
lishment of committees for information exchange. The representatives of the U.S. added 
clauses to the agreements which implied a restrictive use of the research results. Conse-
quently this agreement did not lead to a transfer of knowledge to Brazil either. 
Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) launched the so-called Pan-American Operation (Operação 
Pan-Americana – OPA), which was meant to intensify the general bilateral cooperation be-
tween Brazil and the USA and aimed besides an economic collaboration also at a political 
one. The longer the aligned confrontation continued the less attention the USA paid to Bra-
zil. In the end Kubitschek cancelled the common program for the research of the Brazilian 
uranium sources. He justified this step by lacking advantages for Brazil, since the U.S. gov-
ernment had not agreed to the know-how transfer for the nuclear cycle. In 1956 the IAEA, 
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based in Vienna, as well as the National Nuclear Energy Commission (Comissão Nacional de 
Energia Nuclear – CNEN) was founded. At the same time the latter was also assigned to 
function as a national board of control (licensing, reactor safety) and to coordinate the sector 
of nuclear research and development. Besides civil use, the development of the military nu-
clear capabilities was the prime objective (Heinz 2001: 251), even though this is partially de-
nied in Brazil (Wrobel 1996: 339). Despite all discrepancies, in July 1957 the first two research 
reactors resulting from U.S.-Brazilian cooperation were opened. 
Accordingly, the independent foreign policy of the Goulart government (1961-1964) put a 
considerable strain on the relations with the USA. Various U.S. institutions such as the 
Council of the Americas led by David Rockefeller and the U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon 
contacted the Brazilian opposition and contributed to the destabilization of the democrati-
cally elected government. The United States had neither planned the putsch against Goulart 
nor had Washington directly intervened in the incidents in March/April 1964 (ibid: 55). 
However, the USA sympathised with the new military rulers and were the first American 
country to accept them. The Brazilian regime under Humberto Castelo Branco (1964-1967) 
assumed the rhetoric of the Cold War during the period of the Automatic Alliance with the 
U.S. and pursued an austere finance policy (Soares de Lima 2000: 68).  
During the rule of Costa e Silva (1967-1969) Brazil dissociated itself once again from the spe-
cial relationship with the U.S. and strived for more foreign policy independence. Brazil 
signed the Treaty from Tlatelolco (Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la 
América Latina y el Caribe – Acordo de Tlatelolco)2, which intended a nuclear-free-zone in Latin 
America, and the Caribbean while the states committed themselves not to profit militarily 
from the nuclear technology. Brazil ratified the Tlatelolco-Treaty only in 1994. In 1968 Brazil 
also signed the NPT, but refused the ratification of the document until 1998. Brazil’s long 
lasting attitude of refusal in this matter was due to the discriminating quality of the treaty as 
confirmed by the militaries as well as the Itamaraty. The Brazilian government feared that 
the treaty might form a structural obstacle for the further development of the comparatively 
underdeveloped nuclear technology of the country. Especially the governmental actors op-
posed the institutionalisation of the unequally distributed power within the international 
system, which was intended by the nuclear powers and consolidated by the NPT. The con-
trol regime was considered to be a “neo-colonial” instrument with clearly disadvantageous 
traits for the emerging and developing countries (Soares de Lima 2000: 72). 
The Brazilian government renewed the diversification of the international partners during 
the period called Policentrism. Its own need for development was given special emphasis 
                                                     
2  The complete text of the treaty is to be found under www.opanal.org/opanal/Tlatelolco/Tlatelolco-e.htm, 
4 October 2004. 
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and meant to displace the shadow of the bipolar distribution of the world (Schirm 
2001: 354). At international forums Brazil supported the concerns of the developing coun-
tries again. In 1968 the Brazilian Azevedo da Silveira was elected President of the Group of 
the 77 (Soares de Lima 2000: 68). The Policentrism lasted only two years. Under General Gar-
rastazu Médici (1969-1974) and his Projeto Brasil Potência it was done without linking with 
the developing countries and Latin America. Not the international system as a whole was 
intended to be changed, but merely one’s own position within it.  
Based on the first success with the research reactors, Brazil licensed the U.S. company West-
inghouse, a subsidiary of General Electric, with the construction of the nuclear power station 
Angra 1 in Angra dos Reis (Federal State Rio de Janeiro) in 1972. The control of the peaceful 
use was delegated to the U.S. Atomic Energy Committee. The details of the contract were 
vaguely defined and Brazil did not manage to free itself from the technological dependence 
from the U.S. (ComCiência 2004: 5). The head of the Military Cabinet and the Secretary of 
the National Security Council, General Abreu, commented on it: 
“The North Americans have not only withheld the technical details from us, even 
worse, they have supplied us with a sealed black box without saying what it contains. 
We can only operate the nuclear power plant, nothing else” (Abreu Dallari 1979: 43; 
quoted in Heinz 2001: 251). 
The military government pressed for its own technological success and was under enormous 
pressure due to national energy shortages and Argentine achievements in the field of nuclear 
technology (meanwhile the first Argentine nuclear power plant Atucha 1 had been put into 
operation.). The rise of Japan and oil-rich countries, the opening of the Brazilian economy for 
the international markets and a high economic growth between 1964 and 1974 led the military 
government to assume that Brazil was to become a world power within a very short period of 
time. This also led to the Brazilian claim to be at eye level with the USA for the first time. At 
least on the rhetoric level Washington accepted Brazil’s regional claim to leadership (Schirm 
2001: 354). The Retrenchment-Doctrine of the Nixon-Kissinger administration (1969-1974) re-
garded Brazil as a developing power centre and a key country for the region, which was 
meant to relieve the USA politically (burden sharing) in South America and to carry out part of 
the regional power. Two factors promoted the new role allocation to Brazil in particular: On 
the one hand the more friendly relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union led to ceasing 
effects of the Cold War in Latin America. On the other hand the Vietnam War (1964-1975) ab-
sorbed increasingly more attention and resources from Washington.  
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Nuclear Policy of the Generals: Diversification of Cooperation Partners for the  
Development of Civil and Military Nuclear Technology 
The oil crisis in 1973/1974 increased the necessity of alternative energy production. The dras-
tically raised oil prices jeopardised the Brazilian economic growth. The foreign policy of 
Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) that had lost its ideologies and was still devoted to the develop-
ment of the country was called responsible pragmatism. Ernesto Geisel, the former head of the 
public oil company Petrobrás, created the Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S.A. (Nuclebrás) in 
order to expand the national nuclear programme. After Washington had shown decreasing 
willingness for a transfer of the complete nuclear cycle and demanded the ratification of the 
NPT as condition for the future technology transfer and finally jeopardised the uranium 
supplies for the existing reactor, the Brazilian generals started looking for alternative part-
ners. 
By the Federal Republic of Germany Brazil found a new partner in possession of the desired 
technology. After secret negotiations the Brazilian and the German Foreign Minister signed 
the Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy on 27 July 1975. By the 
year 2000 eight nuclear power plants were planned to be built in Brazil with German know-
how. So far only one nuclear power plant, Angra II, has been constructed. 
Financing problems in Brazil and public pressure in Germany where the anti-nuclear power 
movement and human rights groups turned against the know-how transfer to military re-
gimes made business more difficult. Above all, Germany had ratified the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in contrast to Brazil. Also Washington criticised the nuclear-deal directly. The Ford 
(1974-1976) and Carter administrations (1977-1980) tried to put the government in Bonn off 
the trade and threatened it with sanctions (Moniz Bandeira 1994: 219). 
Finally the German parliament imposed a moratorium in order to postpone for four years 
further German-Brazilian plans . In March 1977 Washington finally succeeded in preventing 
the official Brazilian-German nuclear cooperation. Since the Netherlands and Great Britain 
had been involved in the German uranium enrichment technology through the Uranium 
Enrichment Company (URENCO) and spoken against the trade with Brazil, the agreement 
was thwarted in the end. Altogether the mentioned problems led to a considerable delay. As 
a result the test phase at Angra II could only be assumed in 2000.  
The main reason for Washington’s negative attitude towards a technology transfer was Bra-
zil’s intention of passing atomic know-how and exporting nuclear power plants to other 
developing countries (Schirm 1994: 195). On the one side the U.S. government feared the 
destabilization of the international system and a reduction of its global dominance. On the 
other side well developed commercial interests came into play, since the U.S. delivered 90% 
of the reactors traded on the world market at the end of the 1970s (Luis Bitencourt, interview 
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26 June 2004). So the centre of Washington’s strategic interest was the insistence on the rati-
fication of the NPT by Brazil and other developing countries with the ultimate aim of per-
petuating the balances of nuclear power. 
Recent publications point out that already the Geisel administration had not agreed to con-
fine itself to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Gaspari (2004: 129) quotes statements by 
General Hugo Abreu during the first conference of the Armed Forces Joint Command under 
the Geisel administration on 10 June 1974. Abreu had not only intended the production of 
electric energy: 
“We have got to look at the strategic and political advantages of each single country 
that has got the capability to cause a nuclear detonation. This applies especially to 
those states interested in restoring their prestige within the international relations.” 
Within the familiar circle of his generals, President Geisel also explained that in view of the 
Argentine progresses in the nuclear research one had to intensify one’s own efforts: 
“So we try to develop a technology, which allows us to produce those nuclear weap-
ons that the others [Argentina] possess already. […] If we develop our technology effi-
ciently further, we will reach this aim easily” (ibid: 132, see also O Estado de São 
Paulo, 17 August 2004). 
At the end of the 1970s the Geisel administration initiated a parallel nuclear program, which 
planned the control of the enrichment technology beyond the supervision and safeguarding 
clause by the IAEA (Moniz Bandeira 1994: 236f., Heinz 2001: 253). Additionally the company 
Siemens participated in the secret program (Moniz Bandeira 1994: 227f.). At first, the so 
called parallel program was carried out commonly by the Army, the Air force, the Navy and 
the Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research (Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares – 
IPEN) of the University of São Paulo. The federal government in Brasilia financed it. Later 
on, the Navy was assigned to the sole responsibility for the nuclear research program. 
Wöhlcke (1987: 124) identifies five motives of the Brazilian Armed Forces for the striving for 
nuclear weapons: (1) a demonstration of power directed to the civil society; (2) a symbolic 
demonstration of independence with regard to the hegemonic policy of the USA; (3) the 
emphasis of the regional claim to leadership; (4) the upgrading of the status within the in-
ternational system to an important Third World-power; (5) the reaction to Argentina’s 
atomic bomb program that was probably being developed. 
Again the U.S. reacted with disapproving astonishment to the efforts for nuclear power in 
its backyard. Moreover, President Carter criticised the state of the human rights and the 
“case of Brazil” was put on the foreign policy agenda. On the whole the divergences in hu-
man rights, non-proliferation and nuclear policy led to the further cooling of the relations 
between Washington and Brasilia (Soares de Lima 2000: 74). In the end the U.S. imposed 
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economic sanctions against Brazil, prevented World Bank credits and loans from private 
banks connected with them, since they could also be used for the military nuclear program. 
 
Nuclear Policy of the New Republic: Rapprochement with the U.S. and Integration into 
the Network of International Control Regimes 
In the middle of the 1980s the bilateral relations reached their low. At first, the Brazilian 
arms exports to Libya and Iran were discussed and strongly criticised by Washington. In 
1986 Brazil resumed its diplomatic relations with Cuba. The moratorium on foreign debt 
and Brasilia’s refusal to ratify the NPT let the U.S. Congress put Brazil on the list of the 
states that were not to be dealt with in any forms of military or technological cooperation. 
Making matters worse the Brazilian President José Sarney (1985-1989) announced in Sep-
tember 1986 that Brazil was in possession of the uranium enrichment technology. Two years 
later he confirmed to continue the construction of nuclear power plants. Nuclear physicists 
already forecasted the completion of the first atomic bomb “within the next years” (Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 11 November 1989). The new constitution from 1988 laid formally down 
peaceful aims of the nuclear research and assigned the control of it to the Brazilian Congress 
(article 21 of the Federal Constitution). 
President Collor de Melo tried to release the relationship with the USA and to develop it fur-
ther during his short rule (1990-1992). The military nuclear program was “discovered” and 
dropped to populist success. For this purpose Collor let the test shaft in the Serra do Cachimbo 
(Federal State Pará) be filled up and sealed with cement in front of running cameras in No-
vember 1990. The shaft had been dug in 1981, but it was pretended that it had only recently 
been localised. In the same year Collor explained in front of the United Nations that Brazil 
would not even carry out nuclear tests for civilian purposes. However, behind the scenes Col-
lor doubled the means for the secret funds of which 90% were allocated to the Secretariat for 
Strategic Affairs (SAE) in the budget suggestion for 1991. The remaining ten percent were 
given to consultants of the President and the Military Ministers (Moniz Bandeira 1994: 241). 
The SAE coordinated the military nuclear research, which was mainly pressed ahead with in 
the laboratories of the Navy (Luis Bitencourt, interview on 26 June 2004). 
The positive agenda of the bilateral relations with the U.S. produced by President Collor de 
Melo was threatened by the first Gulf War in the end (Schirm 1994: 191). Since the Iran-Iraq-
War Brazil had become the most important arms supplier for Baghdad. After the Iraqi-
invasion in Kuwait in 1990 Washington criticised the cooperation between Brasilia and 
Baghdad in the missile and nuclear sector. Collor relented and made far-reaching conces-
sions in order not to jeopardise the economic advantages expected from the cooperation 
with Washington. Therefore the USA kept to the confiscation of Brazilian weapon compo-
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nents that were in the USA for further processing. Collor cleverly disguised his careful 
change of the nuclear and arms policy by officially dropping his own military nuclear pro-
gram, reducing arms deliveries in conflict regions and announcing the tightening up of the 
export guidelines for the transfer of sensitive technology (Clóvis Brigagão, interview on 
7 May 2004). 
Furthermore a far-reaching change within the nuclear and arms policy remained missing, 
which also would have been difficult to convey to the powerful Brazilian Armed Forces. In 
view of the virtually non-existent civil supremacy in Brazil concerning security matters at that 
time the question remains, whether the President possessed the necessary autonomy to drop 
the military nuclear program. As far as this goes, one has to agree with Schirm (1994: 198f.) 
who points out: 
“In order to win the influence on the nuclear activities in his own country, Collor 
would have had to withhold the control over the program from the military. However, 
he was either not willing or not able to do so. […] On the whole Brazil’s concession 
was not of a profound character and the country could generally continue with its pol-
icy of reserved independence in the arms industry and nuclear bomb sector.”  
The fact that in April 1991 the Collor administration let the Foreign Minister Resek an-
nounce a closer cooperation with the USA in the sectors of arms trade and defence policy 
suggests the thesis of lacking civil supremacy in these areas. This step had to be revised soon 
due to severe protests by the generals and the Association of the Arms Industry (Associação 
Brasileira das Indústrias de Materiais de Defesa – ABIMDE) (ibid: 194). 
In July 1991 the Brazilian government signed the agreement on the establishment of the Ar-
gentine-Brazilian control agency (Agência Brasileiro Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de 
Materiais Nucleares – ABACC). The IAEA is its fourth treaty partner besides the two states 
and the ABACC. In addition to this, the Brazilian Senate gave way to the ratification of the 
Agreement from Tlatelolco in May 1994. This agreement had already been signed at the end 
of the1960s and planned a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. In view of 
the regional development, the progressive democratisation of Brazil and not at least due to 
the world political turn after 1990 the USA revoked their restrictions on arms exports and 
the sale of high-technology opposite Brazil in August 1995. 
In June 1997 even Brazil ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the end and in doing so ful-
filled the priority security policy request by the USA. One year later Brasilia ratified the nu-
clear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), too. This completed the embedding of the rising 
regional power in the net of international control agreements and declarations of intent in 
the nuclear sector. 
Flemes: Brazil’s Nuclear Policy 17 
The ratification of the NPT is based on a pragmatic decision by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 
After all by the Tlatelolco-Treaty and especially by the ABACC Brazil had already met all 
control commitments the NPT implied – including the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. In 
order to maintain the chances of a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council and to posi-
tion itself as a global actor, it was important to ratify the NPT – already ratified by 148 states – 
and to consolidate the profile of a responsible actor in the international relations by this. 
Nevertheless, the former dependence theorist Cardoso did not move away from considering 
the NPT to be a discriminating instrument. The Brazilian government was far more con-
cerned with improving the possibilities for Brazil’s participation within the international 
system. Accordingly, Brazil and the USA were further moving towards an agreement on 
nuclear and arms policy issues during the two Cardoso terms (1995-2002). In the 1990s the 
two governments signed bilateral agreements on the usage of the Brazilian missile base in 
Alcântara by the USA: One space-agreement and one agreement on the common peaceful 
utilization of nuclear energy. 
 
 
4. Brazil’s Nuclear Policy under President da Silva: A Strategic Conflict with the U.S.? 
Latest Controversies: IAEA-Inspections in Resende II and Alarming U.S. Media Reports 
In October 2003 the Brazilian Minister for Science and Technology Roberto Amaral an-
nounced that Brazil would have had achieved the capability to enrich uranium by means of 
the ultra-centrifuge-procedure3 within the year 2004. Ten years later, Brazil could start to 
export the enriched uranium, the Minister continued. It is true that Amaral named the en-
ergy supply of the country as the main objective of the Brazilian nuclear program, but the 
parting Minister also remarked that Brazil should, at least, not fundamentally exclude the 
development of the capability to build an atomic bomb (see Roul 2004 as well as O Estado 
de São Paulo, 7 October 2003). By this advice Amaral left his successor Eduardo Campo and 
the da Silva administration with a weighty legacy. 
                                                     
3  According to official information, only six states worldwide possess the ultra-centrifuge-
procedure at the moment: Russia, China and Japan as well as the European syndicate Urenco, in 
which Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are involved. In France and in the USA 
the natural uranium is enriched by the gas-diffusion-procedure, which is by now rated as com-
paratively outdated and cost-intensive. It has so far not entirely been clarified which enrichment-
procedure Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea as well as – if applicable – Iran and Libya rely on. 
The IAEA reproaches the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan with acquiring the ultra-
centrifuge-technology of the Urenco by industrial espionage in Europe and passing it on to Iran, 
Lybia and North Korea afterwards.  
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Since December 2003 several reports have been presented in the U.S. media, which criticised 
the Brazilian government’s lack of willingness to cooperate in inspections of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. First, in December 2003 the International Herald Tribune pub-
lished an article by the former U.S. chief-negotiator of the IAEA, James Goodby, with the 
telling title “Brazil gives the U.S. nuclear headache”4. Goodby mentions Brazil together with 
North Korea and Iran. At the same time he points out that all these cases have to be treated 
the same way: 
“If we do not want to have any enriched uranium in North Korea and Iran, then we do 
not want to have any of it in Brazil either.”  
In April 2004 the Washington Post reported under the headline “Brazil Shielding Uranium 
Facility”5 that Brazil denied U.N. inspectors access to the uranium enrichment plant Re-
sende II in the Federal State Rio de Janeiro. In both press reports campaign-statements of the 
Brazilian presidential candidate da Silva on the discriminating effect of the NPT are mixed 
with rumours, according to which the current President is said to have called the ratification 
of the NPT a mistake. Furthermore, the quoted reports create a direct link between these 
alleged statements by da Silva and the Brazilian government’s aversion to sign the Addi-
tional Protocol to the NPT. This connection cannot be found in statements of Brazilian gov-
ernment actors. Finally the U.S. journal Science (see 22 October 2004) published an article, in 
which the authors Liz Palmer and Gary Milhollin suggest that the nuclear program at the 
Brazilian enrichment plant Resende II aims at the immediate construction of up to six atomic 
bombs. The Latin America commissioner of President Bush, Roger Noriega, expressed him-
self more diplomatically, but equally firm: 
“The subject is very difficult, but I believe that our government has got great confi-
dence in Brazil. We have no doubts about the intentions of Brazil […]. Nevertheless, 
we ask Brazil to continue meeting its responsibility in the non-proliferation of nuclear 
materials and to show this by signing the Additional Protocol of the NPT” (see AFP, 
14 April 2004). 
Demonstrations of trust sound undoubtedly different. A Brazilian uranium enrichment ul-
tra-centrifuge, which is planned to be ready to work in 2006 and the technical details of 
which the inspectors of the IAEA show interest in, are the reasons for this. During an inspec-
tion in February/March 2003 the state-owned INB, which is running Resende II, denied the 
U.N. inspectors full access to the centrifuges. The uranium enrichment plant in Resende  
– currently still under construction – is planned to supply the nuclear power plants Angra I, 
                                                     
4  International Herald Tribune, on 31 December 2003, under www.iht.com/articles/123243.html, 
10 October 2004. 
5  Washington Post from 4 April 2004, under www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename= 
article&contentId=A48456-2004Apr3&notFound=true, 7 October 2004. 
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Angra II and soon even Angra III with low enriched uranium (3.5 up to 4%). According to the 
information of the Brazilian government, the ultra-centrifuges used for this have been built 
with their own innovative technology which makes the uranium enrichment by far more 
cost saving than it has so far been the case with the enrichment-procedures in other coun-
tries. 
The research and development expenses for the Brazilian ultra-centrifuge-technology sum 
up already one billion U.S. dollars (Manuel Montenegro, interview on 18 May 2004). 
According to the Brazilian government it is only about protecting the centrifuge technology 
and the national commercial interests connected with it. The ultracentrifuge has a visual 
cover so that the U.N. inspectors cannot see its detailed construction. From Brasilia’s point 
of view this does not impede a more effective control by the IAEA and ABACC. The single 
steps for the realization of the signed agreement are practicable without detailed knowledge 
of the centrifuge. 
The focus of the IAEA inspections is the control of the quantity of the produced uranium 
and its composition. Apart from these inspections the IAEA monitors the uranium enrich-
ment plant of the INB with cameras. Future control modalities for Resende II have already 
been negotiated with the ABACC and are currently being discussed with the IAEA. From 
the negotiations in Vienna it has only become known that the negotiating parties agree that 
continuing controls cannot be forced on Brazil due to the existing treaties. The candidate for 
a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council is far more concerned about its reputation 
within the international community (Manuel Montenegro, interview on 18 May 2004). So far 
Brasilia is not willing to sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT because extended safe-
guards would make the protection of the independently developed centrifuge technology 
even more difficult. 
By the international treaties Brazil has committed itself not to exceed the enrichment degree 
of 20%6. The production of a nuclear explosive charge requires an enrichment degree of 90% 
at least. According to the information of the INB the uranium in Resende II can only be en-
riched up to 5%, which is sufficient for the production of electric energy in nuclear power 
plants. The nuclear reactor of a nuclear operated submarine needs an enrichment degree of 
up to 20%. The Brazilian Navy has been working on the development of a nuclear powered 
submarine over decades and forecasts its opening for 2015 respectively 2018. One concern of 
the IAEA might be that the ultra centrifuge in Resende II is technically capable of exceeding 
                                                     
6  The IAEA defines uranium up to 20% enrichment as “low enriched uranium”. For the production 
of nuclear energy the isotope U 235 is usually enriched up to 5%, while natural uranium consists 
only to 0,7% of the isotopes of the type U 235.  
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the allowed enrichment degree and possibly producing plutonium suitable for the produc-
tion of weapons. 
The mentioned ultracentrifuge has been developed at the research centres of the Brazilian 
Navy, especially at the Centro Experimental Aramar (Federal State São Paulo), which has de-
voted itself to the project of the nuclear powered submarine7 since 1979. The head of the 
military nuclear research centre Aramar, Rear Admiral Alan Arthou, holds the view that the 
Brazilian centrifuge technology is technically superior to the U.S. and European procedures. 
The more efficient and cost-saving enrichment method is based on a magnetic pending pro-
cedure, by which there is no frictional resistance at the more than 1,000 rotations per second. 
Therefore the ultracentrifuge can do without water-cooling and works almost silently 
(Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos junior, interview on 18 May 2004). The innovative centrifuge 
procedure will enable Brazil to participate in the worldwide uranium trade as a competitive 
rival. In other words: The more efficient enrichment method will lead to selling prices that 
are lower than the current prices (Alan Arthou, interview on 21 November 2004).  
On 5 April 2004 the Brazilian Foreign Ministry explained that the Brazilian nuclear program 
constitutionally served only peaceful purposes and has been following the provisions of 
ABACC and the IAEA since 1994 (see Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2004). At the same 
time the Itamaraty emphasised that Brazil meets the international disarmament and non-
proliferation treaties such as the Tlatelolco-treaty, the NPT and the CTBT. By pointing to the 
compliance with all treaties the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects any comparison 
with so-called rogue states. Being the biggest South American country, Brazil is furthermore 
member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multinational institution for the containment 
of the proliferation of materials suitable for the development of nuclear weapons. The NSG 
consists of more than 50 member states in possession of nuclear technology to different de-
grees. 
 
Brazilian Criticism of the U.S. Nuclear Policy: Missing Washington’s Efforts for Nuclear 
Disarmament 
In June 2004 the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Roberto Abdenur, reassured once 
again that Brazil did not agree with the signing of the NPT-Additional Protocol, merely for 
the protection of industrial secrets, and did not pursue any military nuclear plans contrary 
to press reports. After that Abdenur took the offensive and pointed to the Nuclear Posture 
                                                     
7  By now only the five official nuclear powers and permanent members of the Security Council  
– China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the USA – possess nuclear powered submarines. 
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Review8 of the U.S. Pentagon, which violated the NPT by taking the employment of nuclear 
weapons into consideration. By article VI the NPT obliges the nuclear weapon states to 
complete disarmament of their military nuclear inventory. The disarmament conference in 
1996 marked the last crucial step for the disarmament of the nuclear weapons inventory, 
respectively the restriction of militarily motivated nuclear research. The CTBT resulted from 
this conference. It was again the Brazilian ambassador Abdenur who commented the nu-
clear policy of his receiving country undiplomatically in October 2004: 
“[…] the nuclear weapon powers lose their moral authority by demanding more effec-
tive non-dissemination regimes, if they themselves make no progress in their nuclear 
disarmament and even start developing new atomic weapons” (see O Globo, 24 Octo-
ber 2004).  
So far the U.S. Senate denies the ratification of the Test-Ban-Treaty and by this prevents the 
coming into force of the international agreement. Instead the Bush administration planned 
the development of new atomic weapons. To be precise: This is about so-called mini atomic 
bombs (mini nukes), which are intended to destroy targets that are deeply buried under-
ground. This research program aims at creating a practical field for the use of nuclear weap-
ons independent from nuclear deterrence. Furthermore it is planned to ensure that atomic 
bombs could be employed again for the first time since World War II. In December 2004 the 
U.S. Congress stopped this plan by deciding to cut the means for the Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator for the budget year 2005. After the Senate had agreed to this, the Republican 
Chairman of the Budget Subcommittee for Energy Production, Dave Hobson, adopted the 
arguments of the 183 signatory countries of the NPT, which are not in the possession of nu-
clear weapons: 
“This is a very provocative and plainly aggressive policy, which undermines our 
moral authority. Especially if we demand at the same time that other nations should 
surrender nuclear weapons” (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 December 2004). 
The official nuclear weapon states are mainly excluded from IAEA inspections. It is true that 
commercial enrichment plants are controlled – in the USA, for instance. At the same time the 
nuclear weapon states run (military) nuclear plants, which are not investigated by the U.N. 
inspectors. The tightening up of the IAEA-inspections as demanded by Washington and 
London in particular is completely unfounded: After the ratification of the NPT Brazil had 
enclosed a side letter with the treaty, by which Brazil reserves the right for the protection of 
its technology. In this interpretation of the NPT, which the IAEA accepted, Brasilia explicitly 
                                                     
8  This classified Pentagon-document was presented to the U.S. Senate in spring 2002. Amongst other 
things it potentially plans the offensive employment of nuclear weapons (first strike use) against the 
so-called Axis of Evil and against China and Russia. The Nuclear Posture Review had already been 
commissioned by the Clinton administration (see Los Angeles Times, 9 September 2002).  
Flemes: Brazil’s Nuclear Policy 22 
announced the installation of a visual cover for the ultracentrifuge (Alan Arthou, interview 
on 21 November 2004). The governments of the U.S. and Great Britain demand an amend-
ment to the previously and commonly met agreement according to which the inspections 
have been carried out over the last ten years (at first on the basis of the ABACC, and since 
1998 also on the basis of the NPT). A new basis relating to international law, which would 
legitimate extended investigations, implies the Additional Protocol to the NPT (see IAEA 
1997 as well as Hooper 1999). However, the Brazilian government denies the signing of the 
treaty. In this protocol the IAEA-inspectorate’s unrestricted access to each plant and place 
connected with nuclear activities is intended (strengthened safeguards). 
 
Strategic Divergence of Interest: Securing Energy Resources and Uranium Trade 
Brazil and the USA pursue their interests against a common nature-historical background: 
The foreseeable end of oil, gas and coal reserves. With 439 reactors in 31 states nuclear en-
ergy covers currently already 16 per cent of the worldwide energy production. In view of 
the increasing demand for electric energy that is to be expected the forecasts proceed from 
the assumption that the number of reactors will be multiplied by five over the next decades. 
At the same time the capacity of each reactor will be multiplied by four (Brigagão 2004: 2). 
Accordingly, the global trade with enriched uranium is already very profitable by now and 
moreover with a highly promising future. Only in 2005 almost 20 billion U.S. dollars have 
been earned on the worldwide (official) uranium-market (see O Globo, 20 March 2006). Es-
pecially the most populous countries of the world – which Brazil and the USA belong to – 
have got an increased interest in the securing of energy resources. Furthermore Brazil wants 
to join into the uranium trade medium-term and the USA intends to expand its participation 
in the billion-dollar-business (for commercial as well as strategic reasons). The basic condi-
tion for the profit-oriented participation in the international uranium trade is an economi-
cally efficient enrichment technology. 
According to plans of the Brazilian government, about 60% of the enriched uranium re-
quired for the operation of the reactors Angra I and Angra II is intended to be produced at 
national production plants by 2010. From 2014 on, the export of enriched uranium is 
planned in addition to the supply of the not yet completed reactor Angra III9 (see O Estado 
de São Paulo, 7 October 2003). At the moment Brazil, which has got the third-biggest ura-
nium reserves10 worldwide, transports the depleted uranium to Canada first and from there 
                                                     
9  The current Minister of Science and Technology, Sergio Rezende, plans the construction of seven 
more nuclear reactors in Brazil for the next 15 years (see O Globo, 9 March 2006). 
10  According to statements of the INB, uranium sources have been found in Brazil in the quantity of 
more than 400,000 tons. At the same time only one quarter of the state territory has been tested for 
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to the enrichment plants of the European Urenco, from where it is delivered back to the Bra-
zilian nuclear power plants. According to the information by the Minister for Science and 
Technology, Campos, Brasilia spends 12 million U.S. dollars annually on this complicated 
procedure for the enrichment of Brazilian uranium. This is another central reason why the 
government wants to enrich the uranium in Brazil (see Folha de São Paulo, 8 April 2004).  
Apart from the economic advantages of the U.S. nuclear industry President Bush also specu-
lates on the security policy advantages for the international community resulting from a 
limited number of state actors in the possession of militarily useful nuclear know-how. The 
U.S. President did not take the arguments of the Brazilian government (according to which 
the emerging and developing countries have to endure the technological dependence from 
the U.S. and other developed countries even in the context of their civil nuclear research) 
seriously into account, when he announced on 11 February 2004: 
“Countries that have so far not produced [enriched/high enriched] uranium should 
not be allowed to start doing so. Instead they could import nuclear fuel for an ade-
quate price, provided these countries would accept rigorous controls by the IAEA” 
(quoted in Roul 2004: 2). 
By rigorous IAEA-inspections President Bush has obviously referred to the signing of the 
Additional Protocol to the NPT. The Brazilian nuclear establishment reacted displeased and 
described the ideas of the U.S. President as unacceptable (ibid). According to the Director of 
the Brazilian centrifuge program, Admiral Arthou, the USA have already invested about 
three billion U.S. dollars in the development of a commercially competitive centrifuge tech-
nology – so far without success (Alan Arthou, interview on 21 November 2004). Should the 
U.S. actually be interested in the Brazilian centrifuge technology, it remains questionable, 
why the public INB does not follow the usual procedure for the protection of innovative 
technologies: The filing of an international patent. 
According to unofficial statements on this a procedure of this kind is just as little protected 
against U.S. industrial espionage as the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency have to act exclusively and at any time in accordance with the interests of the 
United Nations. Voices of the Foreign Ministries of the nuclear weapon states and the envi-
ronment of the IAEA deliver – also off the tape – another explanation for Brasilia’s isolating 
strategy. These speculations link the Brazilian ultracentrifuges with the illegal activities of 
the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan. As early as in February 2004 Khan, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
uranium-oxid supplies. The biggest uranium reserves have so far been localised in the Federal 
States Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Minas Gerais and Paraná (see Folha de São Paulo, 5 April 2004). 
4.4 million tons is the estimated value of the natural uranium reserves worldwide. At the same 
time Kazakhstan (957,000 tons) and Australia (910,000 tons) have got the biggest uranium reserves 
and rank long before Brazil, South Africa, the USA and Canada.  
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“father of the Pakistani bomb”, had admitted having illegally passed on nuclear know-how 
to Iran and Libya. The Pakistani had probably also been involved in the construction of the 
North Korean A-bomb program (see Der Spiegel, 7/2004 as well as 13/2004). Other specula-
tions concern a former German Urenco collaborator, who is suspected of having delivered 
blueprints to Brasilia (see Science, 22 October 2004). 
In October 2004 the Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and the U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell appeased the diplomatic tensions on nuclear policy by unanimously announc-
ing that the inspections of the Brazilian nuclear plants were no longer an issue of the bilat-
eral relations. According to Secretary Powell, Washington trusts that Brazil will find a satis-
fying solution together with he IAEA (see Powell 2004). A few months earlier Brasilia had 
agreed to take the supreme command of the U.N. stabilisation mission MINUSTAH in Haiti. 
By this the Brazilian government had followed Washington’s wish of contributing to the 
political and economic costs for the stability of Latin America and thus to unburden the su-
perpower. This is a possible reason for the U.S. government’s change of policy marked by 
new trust in the da Silva administration (see Schaffer 2005). Not least due to the support 
from Washington Brasilia and the IAEA agreed on a confidential control regime for Re-
sende II within a few months only. The agreement allows the IAEA-inspectors the control of 
the incoming and outgoing uranium (quantity and enrichment degree), but not the inspec-
tion of the ultracentrifuge, which is still equipped with a visual cover. So far, the IAEA has 
inspected the enrichment plant near Rio de Janeiro 32 times. 
 
 
5. Prospects of Brazil’s Role in Global Nuclear Policy 
Since the beginning of 2006, the Brazilian nuclear policy has been given international atten-
tion again. Firstly, the complete starting of the uranium enrichment plant in Resende II coin-
cides with the growing diplomatic conflict over the uranium enrichment in Iran. Secondly, 
Washington increasingly criticises Brazilian cooperation plans in the field of the civil use of 
nuclear energy with partners such as Venezuela and China. Thirdly, the U.S. government 
concluded a nuclear agreement with India in order to counterbalance the Brazilian coopera-
tion partner China, although Delhi has not signed the NPT. 
 
The Comparison with Iran 
The simultaneousness of the enrichment activities of the NPT-signatory states Brazil and 
Iran calls for comparison especially in view of the different dealing with them by the inter-
national community. Titled “Brazil Going Nuclear” in the conservative news magazine The 
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New American, William Norman Grigg reminds of Brazil’s secret military nuclear program 
that was stopped 15 years ago before he draws a real horror scenario:  
“The parallels between Brazil’s nuclear ambitions and Iran’s are numerous and strik-
ing. One critical strategic difference is found in the fact that if Marxist-led Brazil be-
came a full-fledged member of the nuclear weapon club, its alliance with Beijing, its 
developing space program, and its proximity to the U.S. would make it a far greater 
potential threat than Iran could ever be“ (see The New American, 26 February 2006). 
In the less polemic article “Brazil poised to join the world’s nuclear elite” it is emphasised 
that since its re-democratisation Brazil has presented itself as a responsible member of the 
world community, which is neither striving for nuclear weapons nor threatening any other 
state militarily. Furthermore, all nuclear plants of the Amazon states are under the control of 
the IAEA and ABACC (see Miami Herald, 12 February 2006). In view of the scarcity of en-
ergy in Brazil, which is relatively poor of fossil fuel compared with its population, the de-
velopment of the nuclear power makes more sense than in the oil rich Iran. The authoritar-
ian Iranian regime probably supports the Jihad terrorism, has threatened to destroy Israel 
and kept the enrichment technology acquired by the smuggling ring of the Pakistani Abdul 
Qadir Khan secret from the international community for 18 years. Even today, Teheran re-
fuses the inspectors of the IAEA free admittance to the country’s nuclear plants. 
It is true that these differences between the Brazilian and the Iranian case also justify a dif-
ferent dealing by the U.S. government as well as the United Nations with the nuclear ambi-
tions of the two states. Nevertheless, an observation of the IAEA-Director Muhammad El 
Baradei has to be considered generally:  
“As soon as states possess the civil enrichment technology and subsequently a great 
quantity of enriched uranium and plutonium, the step to military use is so small that 
the IAEA can hardly control it” (see Financial Times, 2 February 2005). 
So far, at least two arguments should be taken into consideration before legitimising Brasilia 
to become the ninth country of the world to enrich uranium. 
Firstly, a change of nuclear policy within the Brazilian elite against the background of a 
changing global security situation cannot be excluded medium-term. Especially the nuclear 
weapon arsenals of North Korea and Pakistan (soon maybe Iran and Libya) involve a risk 
for all non-nuclear-weapon-countries that is difficult to calculate. Moreover, the second U.S.-
led Iraq-intervention and the simultaneous acceptance of the North Korean regime lead to 
the assumption that only nuclear deterrence can guarantee the territorial integrity in the 
end. The defence doctrine of the Brazilian Army is founded on a conflict hypothesis, which 
proceeds on the assumption of a U.S. military intervention in the Amazon region (see Fle-
mes 2004a, Marques 2004). Particularly the Brazilian Armed Forces, who stand up for a de-
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terrence policy by tradition and who influence security and defence policy even today (see 
Flemes 2004b), might promote the development of defensively aligned nuclear weapons. 
Secondly, each additional military or civil nuclear power increases the proliferation risk. In 
contrast to Iran, Brazil is not suspected to support the transnational terrorism. There is a 
danger that Brasilia might pass its enrichment technology on to states intending its military 
utilization or passing on the expertise or the weapons-grade material to violent actors again. 
 
Potential Brazilian Partners: China and Venezuela 
In May 2005, the Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced the development of a Latin 
American nuclear program between Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela in his TV-program 
“Aló Presidente”. Iran was intended to support it. The Brazilian government dissociated 
itself from the initiative after that (see O Estado de São Paulo, 23 May 2005). The govern-
ment of President Chávez supported the Iranian OPEC-partner by voting in the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly against a referral of the Iran case to the Security Council. On the occasion of 
Iran’s Parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel`s visit to Venezuela in May 2006, Cara-
cas and Teheran concluded an agreement on common raw material exploitation. Little is 
known about its content, though. According to unconfirmed reports from Venezuelan oppo-
sition circles, the agreement also includes the common uranium exploitation in the Amazon 
area for exports to Iran (see The Washington Times, 13 June 2005). 
After Brasilia’s frigid reaction to the cooperation initiative by the inclusion of Teheran the 
Venezuelan head of government suggested another initiative in October 2005. That time 
excluding Iran. The foreign policy consultant of the Brazilian President, Marco Aurélio Gar-
cia, confirmed immediately that he did not see “any problems” with the cooperation be-
tween Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela concerning the civil use of nuclear energy (see O 
Estado de São Paulo, 15 October 2005). The U.S. Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice, de-
scribes President Chávez as a “negative factor in the hemisphere” (see Schaffer 2005). The 
U.S. is not interested in passing on nuclear knowledge to the Chavist Venezuela. Lately 
Washington has repeatedly vetoed against arms purchases advised by Caracas. After Israel 
and Spain were not allowed to deliver F-16 combat aircrafts equipped with U.S. technology 
to Venezuela, Brazil will deliver military aircrafts of the type AMX-Tucano. In view of U.S. 
criticism on the future nuclear cooperation between Brasilia and Caracas, President da Silva 
announced that Brazil’s sovereignty would not be restricted only because other states repre-
sent divergent positions (see O Estado de São Paulo, 15 October 2005). 
Since Brazil has committed itself in the NPT to not passing on its enrichment technology to a 
third party, the Director of the powerful National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), 
Odair Gonçalves, considers the nuclear medicine to be the only field for cooperation with 
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Venezuela (see O Estado de São Paulo, 16 October 2005). Above all, it is questionable, 
though, what advantages Brazil expects from the nuclear cooperation with its South Ameri-
can neighbours. Venezuela has neither a nuclear program nor any experience in the produc-
tion of nuclear energy. The Argentine program is far behind the Brazilian one. Compensa-
tion with other fossil fuels would be thinkable. After all, the newcomer in Mercosur Vene-
zuela, being the country with the biggest gas reserves in Latin America and the fifth-biggest 
oil exporter of the world, also propels the regional energy policy cooperation11. Its main con-
cern is the Petrosur-concept, which aims at supporting the cooperation of the South Ameri-
can state-owned oil companies and forming strategic alliances. 
In view of the limited risk of a technology transfer from Brasilia to Caracas, the U.S. State 
Department could also rate the developing energy and nuclear policy cooperation between 
the South American states as positive. After all Venezuela, supervised by the Brazilian re-
gional leader, is far more calculable than an axis Caracas-Teheran. The nuclear policy coop-
eration between Brazil and Argentina has so far been connected with mutual and interna-
tional duties and controls (ABACC, IAEA) (see Paul 2000: 99ff.). If a productive cooperation 
in the civil use of nuclear energy could actually be realised in the trilateral context, the same 
standards would probably apply.  
In contrast to the cooperation on the South American level, the mutual advantage of Brazil-
ian – Chinese cooperation is obvious. China is keen on imports of Brazilian uranium in order 
to secure the supply of its growing nuclear sector. In return, Peking is expected to invest in 
the Brazilian nuclear program, which is financially weak. Furthermore, the half-state-owned 
Brazilian Nuclep is planned to participate in the construction of Chinese nuclear plants. The 
Nuclep has planned and built Angra I and II. If a deal of this kind will actually be put into 
practice, is highly questionable, though. So far, Brazilian laws prohibit the export of crude 
uranium, which is defined as a strategic resource. An amendment of law is thinkable, but 
the Congress would have to confirm it. The CNEN is instructed to produce a report for the 
President, which might result in an adequate bill. Apart from the representatives of the 
Presidential Office, the commission consists of envoys of the Ministries for Energy and Min-
ing, Environmental Protection, Science and Technology, Planning as well as Industry and 
Commerce. In contrast to difficult planning of the nuclear cooperation, numerous achieve-
ments can be proven in the field of civil air and space cooperation, since Brazil and China 
have agreed on their “strategic partnership” in 1993. In 1999 and 2003, the two states placed 
                                                     
11  In January 2006 Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement on the construction of an 
8,000 kilometres long gas pipeline through the whole of South America. Apart from that, the gas- 
and oil deposits in San Jorge (Argentina) and the Orinoko Basin (Veneuela) are planned to be 
commonly exploited. In 2005 Brasilia and Caracas agreed on common investments in oil refinery 
and gas-production projects of the amount of 3.5 billion U.S. dollars.  
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two commonly built satellites (CBER-1 and CBER-2). Three more bilateral satellite projects 
are planned for the following years. 
 
The Strategic Partnership between Washington and Delhi 
In March 2006, the USA and India founded a “strategic partnership”, too. In the context of a 
bilateral treaty on the cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Washington will 
supply Delhi with the latest nuclear power stations and enriched uranium. Furthermore, the 
U.S. wants to sell F-16 and F-18 combat aircrafts to India. During President Bush’s visit to 
India, the Pentagon announced: 
“It is our aim to support India in covering its requirements in the defence sector. 
[…]We want to deliver important skills and technologies, which India strives for” 
(quoted in: Die Welt, 3 March 2006). 
In return, the Indian government commits itself for the first time to putting a part of its nu-
clear installations in charge of the IAEA-controls. Nevertheless, India insisted on excluding 
eight of its 22 reactors from it. This way the Indian military can continue to produce fissile 
material for nuclear warheads. Delhi will not open its “fast breeders”, which produce vast 
amounts of weapon-grade plutonium, for international controls. Before the treaty becomes 
effective, the U.S. Congress has to ratify it. So far, the technology transfer to states not sign-
ing the NPT is lawfully prohibited in the USA. Additionally, the Nuclear Supplier Group 
must agree.  
As far as the cooperation with India is concerned, the government of President Bush is 
above all interested in counterbalancing China in Asia. The moderation of the global oil 
competition might be another aim of Washington. Just like China, even India, which is 
growing by more than seven percent a year, has an enormous energy demand and will be-
come a rival to the U.S. over oil reserves in the Far and Middle East. Internally the rap-
prochement with the USA is highly controversial in India. The opposition criticises the 
agreement as “carte blanche” for Washington to capture and instrumentalize India. By the 
delivery of enriched uranium as fuel for the Indian nuclear plants, the U.S. government has 
a means for putting pressure on the Indian breeder program or the nuclear weapon re-
search, parts of the Indian nuclear establishment say. These critics also regard the foreign 
policy manoeuvring space as restricted. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
thought it necessary to state explicitly that India’s latest vote against Iran in the IAEA goes 
back to its miserable willingness to cooperate and not to U.S. pressure (see Guardian, 24 
February 2006). 
How must the agreement between India and the USA be assessed in view of the contain-
ment of proliferation? Positively, because India is now rewarded for not passing on its nu-
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clear weapon technique to other countries – unlike Pakistan. One could argue that each 
agreement allowing the IAEA more inspection rights implies a progress. 
Surely, those member states of the NPT that have done without the development of nuclear 
weapons must feel insulted. They might get the impression as if it had been wiser not to sign 
the treaty and to develop nuclear weapons in order to be rewarded by nuclear cooperation. 
This applies to Brazil, for example, which has qualified itself for an intensification of the 
nuclear cooperation with the USA just like India by its good behaviour – should Washington 
apply the same standards. In other words: The Indian precedent weakens the international 
consensus against the passing on of nuclear technology. The comparison of the Indian with 
the Iranian case leads to a similar conclusion: Who signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty is 
sanctioned, because he does not comply with its rules. Who refuses to sign is forgiven any-
thing he develops independently – including nuclear weapons. 
In the end, the U.S. has lost even more moral authority within the global nuclear policy by 
its rapprochement with India. This had been decimated anyway, because the superpower 
does not fulfil its duty of disarming its nuclear weapon arsenals as laid down in the NPT 
(see Thränert 2004). By this, the arguments of the White House concerning the containment 
of Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapon programs lose their powers of persuasion 
strongly. As far as that goes, even from Washington’s perspective, it might (prove to) be 
wrong to give counterbalancing China more priority than the principle of the non-
proliferation. A stronger support in competing for a permanent seat in reformed U.N. Secu-
rity Council would have been an alternative to the consolidation of the Indian regional 
power. Overall, the so-called strategic partnership between India and the USA is an exem-
plary for the triumph of unilateral power politics over the aim of nuclear weapon reduction, 
which is codified in international law. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The Brazilian nuclear program is under extensive international control. As long as Brazil 
does withdraw from the NPT neither the IAEA nor the U.S. State Department has to become 
alarmed. If Brasilia in the medium-term and against all expectations were to consider this 
option in order to develop nuclear weapons after all, Washington would have considerably 
contributed to this development in view of the Indian example. Nevertheless, from today’s 
perspective a scenario of this kind seems as unlikely as the passing on of Brazilian enrich-
ment technology to the Chavist Venezuela. After all, President da Silva’s foreign policy 
course (just like the one of his predecessor Cardoso) aims at Brazil’s establishing as decision 
Flemes: Brazil’s Nuclear Policy 30 
maker within the international system. The aspirant to a permanent seat in the Security 
Council will not put its hard-earned international prestige at risk in order to invest in a nu-
clear weapon project, which is hardly eligible for financing anyway. Washington’s accep-
tance of the Brazilian claim to regional leadership is not reflected by the fact that the U.S. 
government has finally come to terms with the Brazilian uranium enrichment in Resende. 
Brasilia’s commitment in Haiti contributes to this. The U.S. who has reached its limits of 
power projection capacities acknowledges this gratefully. Furthermore, the Brazilian presi-
dent is regarded as an honest actor in the White House concerning the considerably strained 
relations with the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia. In summary, realizing the de-
pendence on strong partners in the different world regions explains the Bush government’s 
Brazil policy that is marked by acceptance and trust12. Preferred partners are highly popu-
lated democracies with high growth potential and regional leader status. Both Brazil and 
India present themselves – in the context of the WTO-negotiations, for instance – as actors of 
the international system that are equally led by clear national interests and therefore calcu-
lable. 
The Indian case differs from the Brazilian one mainly in the U.S. strategic interest in winning 
India as long-term ally against China. From this perspective, conventional arm deliveries 
seem to be an opportune decision and the acceptance of the Indian nuclear weapons a neces-
sity of Realpolitik. After all the bilateral cooperation in civil use of nuclear energy serves the 
purpose of reducing the pressure on the global energy market. In view of these higher stra-
tegic aims, the undermining of the anyway outdated Non-Proliferation Treaty is an accept-
able collateral damage for Washington. As far as this goes, the nuclear cooperation with a 
non-NPT-signatory state marks new territory for the USA. Nevertheless, by the safety de-
vice of worldwide energy resources and the subordination of multilateral treaties and inter-
national law the cooperation treaty with India reflects two keynotes of President Bush’s for-
eign policy. While explaining the hard line opposite Teheran another principle propagated 
by the Bush administration takes effect: Cooperation with democracies and containment of 
authoritarian states. Washington’s cooperation with the main proliferator Pakistan in the 
containment of transnational terrorism stands again for a short-breathed pragmatism, which 
superimposes on the foreign policy principles and the keynotes. 
From Brazilian perspective, Washington’s incalculable foreign and nuclear policy and espe-
cially the historic experience of futile waiting for U.S. nuclear expertise speak against striv-
ing for an exclusive partnership with the superpower. So far, Brazil has not yet found its role 
                                                     
12  In the Africa strategy of the White House a procedure is exemplified, which intents to facilitate the 
intervention in different subregions of Africa by good relations with so-called key anchor states. See 
under www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa.  
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within the concert of nuclear powers. At this point, it is hard to say, if Brasilia will decide 
between Washington and Peking or if it will find its way together with other Southern re-
gional leaders such as India and South Africa. Independent of possible partners, in the fu-
ture Brazil should manage to redress its scarcity of energy on the one hand and to play a 
vital role in the worldwide trade with enriched uranium on the other hand. After all Brazil is 
one of very few countries, which have enormous uranium deposits and an efficient enrich-
ment technology at the same time. If the currently starting social debate on the pro and con-
tra of nuclear energy in Brazil results in an expansion of the nuclear sector, the scenario of a 
civil nuclear power is most likely for the Amazon state. 
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